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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Kenyan media, currently ranked as “partly free”,1 for at least a decade have played a key 
role in exposing corruption scandals in the country. This is evident from the fact that it is the 
media which brought to the public’s attention the infamous 1990s Goldenberg and the Anglo-
Leasing scandals. These were made public by courageous reporters despite the best efforts of 
the respective sitting governments to suppress the information by any means necessary. 
However, this exposure has not ended or decreased corruption.2 
At the domestic level, the Kenyan legal and institutional framework in place to combat 
corruption is very elaborate. With more than a dozen pieces of legislation and five 
administrative bodies that work alongside the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC),3 
one wonders why the fight against corruption has not been successful. At the international 
level, Kenya ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 9 December 
2003,4 and on 3 February 2007 it ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AU Convention).5 Regionally Kenya is a partner state to the East African 
Community and has expressed support for the draft East African Community Protocol on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption. The EACC is also member of the East African Association 
of Anti-Corruption Authorities. As of July 2014, Kenya’s national assembly had passed laws to 
domesticate both UNCAC and the AU Convention. 
Despite all the legislative activity and the ratification of international instruments, corruption in 
Kenya remains endemic. In their campaigns, politicians often make the prevention, suppression 
                                                          
1 Freedom House (2016). 
2 Afrimap (2015).  
3 EACC (2011). 
4 United Nations Convention against Corruption: Status. 
5 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: Status. 
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and punishment of corruption a part of their manifesto when seeking votes from the public.6 
However, soon after elections are over and they assume office, their anti-corruption campaign 
promises often collapse and are sidelined until the next campaign period. 
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission was established, pursuant to the Constitution of 
2010,7 as an investigative body to prevent and fight corruption. Its powers, structure and 
mandate are set out in detail in the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003. 
However, the EACC has not realised its mandate fully due, among other things, to political 
interference, lack of financial resources and understaffing.8 
This research paper will evaluate critically the history of the EACC’s establishment, while 
discussing certain best practice standards that, when incorporated into the management of the 
Commission, could lead to reducing corruption in the country. The research will end with 
recommendations relating to areas that need to be improved in order to achieve a higher 
success rate in the fight against corruption. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
Whereas the general purpose of the study is to examine the role of anti-corruption agencies in 
the fight against corruption, this paper will focus on Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission. 
The paper will review the legal and institutional framework governing the Commission. It will 
attempt to identify issues pertaining to the effective administration of an anti-corruption body. 
Key issues in this regard are whether the institution enjoys the necessary independence and 
autonomy to carry out its functions, and whether it has been established merely to appease 
international donors or actually to seek durable solutions to the problem of corruption. The 
financial resources of the Commission will be reviewed in an effort to determine whether it is 
funded adequately. The staffing and human resources of the Commission will be analysed also, 
                                                          
6 See Jubilee Manifesto. 
7 Article 79 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
8 Afrimap (2015). 
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with attention being given to the mode of appointment and security of tenure of the office 
holders in order to assess the level of integrity amongst both its top officials and its junior staff. 
In addition, best practice standards for an anti-corruption commission will be evaluated 
critically, with a particular reference to the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption 
Agencies. This analysis will be undertaken in an attempt to identify good practice guidelines for 
the EACC. 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
This paper is limited to the situation in Kenya and to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission. It is concerned with the law, strategy and powers being used by the Commission. 
In this regard, specific attention will be afforded to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
Act of 2011. 
Reference will be made also to the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies 
as well as to other anti-corruption agencies to the extent that they may be relevant and helpful 
in analysing the EACC. The study will consider also the domestic and international instruments 
that are relevant to the execution of the Commission’s mandate. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The study seeks to answer and find solutions to the following questions: 
 What role does the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya play in combating 
corruption? 
 What are some of the challenges facing the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission? 
 How best can the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission perform its functions? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
One of the biggest problems facing Kenya is corruption and its effects on the country’s 
economy are devastating. Kenya’s response to the problem of corruption, prompted in part by 
international pressure, was to pursue the establishment of an anti-corruption agency.9 A 
                                                          
9 Afrimap (2015). 
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process of formation, restructuring and renaming culminated in the establishment in 2011 of 
the EACC as a national dedicated anti-corruption body with the sole mandate of fighting 
corruption. 
As an institution, the EACC is charged with the responsibility of investigating and 
recommending corruption cases for prosecution. It also raises public awareness through 
education and training on the negative effects of corruption as well as on prevention, risk 
assessment and asset recovery. 
From its mandate, it is clear that the EACC occupies a critical role in the Kenyan anti-corruption 
agenda. It is important thus that the institution performs its functions competently if headway 
is to be made against corruption. There is, therefore, an urgent need to look at the structure of 
the Commission, at the challenges it is facing, and at its powers, duties and functions in a bid to 
establish how best it would be able to perform its mandate and what, if anything, needs to be 
done in order to improve its performance. 
1.6 Methodology 
The study is qualitative in nature. It employs the desktop data collection method to analyse 
critically the relevant primary and secondary sources in order to develop answers to the 
research questions. 
1.7 Historical Overview 
Corruption and anti-corruption in Kenya date back to the colonial era.10 This is evident from 
stories about the struggle for independence, of home guards who were not involved actively in 
the Mau Mau rebellion “selling” freedom fighters to the colonial administration for petty 
favours.11 This, among other acts, is seen as the earliest form of corrupt practices amongst the 
native Kenyans. However, corruption and corrupt practices were also common amongst 
officials of the colonial government. Although not documented in official surveys, legislative 
                                                          
10 Loughran (2010). 
11 Munyae & Lesetedi (1998). 
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instruments and historical works, the extent of corruption during Kenya’s pre-independence era 
may be deduced from individual memoirs and autobiographies of the period.12 
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance of 1956 was the first piece of anti-corruption 
legislation passed by the colonial government. This law may be taken as the country’s initial 
response to the problem of corruption.  
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance of 1956 became the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 
65, LOK) at independence. As the country settled down to self-government, corruption 
continued to rise and the public started taking an interest in corruption and demanding that 
perpetrators of corruption be prosecuted. After an amendment to the Prevention of Corruption 
Act, the first Anti-Corruption Squad was created in 1991.13 The Anti-Corruption Squad was a 
department within the Kenya Police and was headed by a senior police officer. Its main function 
was to enforce the Prevention of Corruption Act by conducting investigations relating to 
allegations of corruption and then recommending appropriate cases for prosecution. The Anti-
Corruption Squad was answerable to the Criminal Investigative Department and was disbanded 
in 1995 before it could make any significant impact on the fight against corruption. 
The failure of the Anti-Corruption Squad may be credited to the fact that, even to date, the 
Kenyan public views the police as the most corrupt department of government. This perception 
is supported by various rankings and surveys.14 With an already negative public perception 
regarding its integrity, it was almost impossible to expect that the Anti-Corruption Squad could 
make much progress in investigating corruption cases. 
A further amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act led to the creation of the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority (KACA).15 The KACA was given the mandate to investigate offences of 
corruption and take necessary measures to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors. 
Various criticisms have been levied regarding the timing of the creation of the KACA.16 It was a 
                                                          
12 Anderson (2006) 49. 
13 EACC (2011). 
14 Daily Nation (2016). 
15 Section 11B of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 65, LOK, repealed). 
16 Gathii (2010) 35.  
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common view across the Kenyan public that the KACA was created to appease donors who, at 
the time, had suspended the issuing of funds to the country. The Authority’s first director, who 
was a political aspirant and a former police inspector, was appointed in December 1997. 
However, after only six months in office, he was suspended and later in 1998 was removed by  
a Judicial Tribunal, appointed by the then President, Daniel Arap Moi. The Tribunal 
recommended the director’s removal for having acted ultra vires.17 
In March 1999, the second director of the KACA was appointed. The new appointee was a judge 
of the High Court who commanded much respect from the public. His appointment revived 
hopes in the KACA’s quest to fight and reduce corruption. However, in the year 2000 a High 
Court ruling abolished the KACA, bringing to an end its efforts to fight corruption.18 Then, in 
2001, the Anti-Corruption Police Unit (ACPU) was created by executive order. The ACPU 
operated under the auspices of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the police and 
it took over and performed the functions of the KACA.  
Following Kenya’s transition to a functional multi-party democracy, in 2002 Mwai Kibaki was 
elected president on an anti-corruption platform. The new government enacted the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act No 3 of 2003 to replace the Prevention of Corruption Act 
which had been operating from August 1956 to May 2003.19 Subsequently, the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission (KACC) was established under the Anti-Corruption and Economic 
Crimes Act to replace the Anti-Corruption Police Unit. The Anti-Corruption and Economic 
Crimes Act prescribed the composition of and conferred powers and functions on the KACC. 
The Act also established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board.20 The Advisory Board was 
empowered to make recommendations for the appointment of the Director and Assistant 
Directors of the KACC. It also was tasked with advising the KACC generally on the exercise of its 
powers and the performance of its functions. 
                                                          
17 Mutonyi (2005) 79-83. 
18 Stephen Mwangi Gachiengo & Another v Republic (2000). 
19 Transparency International (2012) 348. 
20 Section 16 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 3 of 2003. 
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After the 2010 referendum, Kenya started operating under a new Constitution. The new 
Constitution contains principles that promote transparency, integrity and accountability.  It also 
made provision for a new independent anti-corruption agency.21 Consequently, the country’s 
Parliament disbanded the KACC in 2011, in line with the requirements of the new Constitution, 
and created the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). 
The EACC has been operational since its inception in 2011. It is the only agency in the country 
charged with the mandate of fighting corruption. It investigates allegations of corruption, and 
educates and sensitises the general public on the negative effects of corruption. It also 
forwards cases for prosecution to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP). 
However, the EACC, despite constitutional backing and a series of legislative provisions that 
support its mandate, still struggles with the huge task of loosening the grip of corruption on the 
country. 
From the findings of various corruption surveys, Kenya continues to be ranked among the most 
corrupt countries in the world. According to the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2015, the level of corruption in Kenya continues to be perceived as 
high. The table below shows Kenya’s score and ranking in the CPI from 2010 (one year before 
the EACC was established) to 2015.22 
Year CPI Score Ranking/Number of Countries 
2010 21 154/178 
2011 22 154/183 
2012 27 139/176 
2013 27 136/177 
2014 25 145/175 
2015 25 139/168 
Kenya’s dismal performance in the Transparency International surveys is confirmed at the 
domestic level by the EACC itself. According to its National Survey on Corruption and Ethics 
                                                          
21 Article 79 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
22 Transparency International CPI (2010-2015). 
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conducted for the year 2014/2015, the level of corruption in the country was found also to be 
unacceptably high,23 with 74 percent of the respondents perceiving it to be very high as 
opposed to only 5.6 percent thinking it is low. The survey also compared the current level of 
corruption in the country to that of the previous year, and found that 50.4 percent of the 
respondents said that corruption had increased. 
The establishment of the EACC, as a national dedicated anti-corruption agency with the 
mandate to investigate corruption and economic crimes as well as to raise awareness about 
the damaging impact of corruption, continues to be an important milestone in the fight 
against corruption in Kenya. The Commission plays a critical role in combating corruption and 
its success remains an important part of the country’s anti-corruption agenda. 
This paper will review critically the following matters in an attempt to determine the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya: 
 the composition of the Commission; 
 the functions of the Commission and its investigative and prosecutorial powers; 
 the appointment of the Commission’s members; 
 staffing, recruitment and tenure of members of the Commission; 
 the financial resources of the Commission; 
 the reporting mechanism of the Commission; and 
 the stability of the Commission. 
In reviewing the above items, the paper will discuss other variables that are considered to be 
international best practice standards. 
  
                                                          
23 National Ethics and Corruption Survey (2015). 
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1.8 Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
This research paper is composed of five more chapters as follows: 
Chapter Two 
This chapter will analyse the legal, policy and institutional framework that governs the EACC. It 
will explore the relationship between the domestic laws and the international instruments on 
the effective and efficient operation and management of anti-corruption agencies. 
Chapter Three 
This chapter will discuss the international best practice standards that promote and strengthen 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies. Also factors proposed by the Jakarta Statement 
on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies will be reviewed. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter will analyse critically the role of the EACC in Kenya, its mandate and its operational 
structure. It will review the Commission’s powers and strategies in the fight against corruption. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter will comprise a general conclusion to the research paper. It will discuss and make 
recommendations drawn from the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING AND COMBATING CORRUPTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a consensus that corruption is a problem of international concern.1 It has far-reaching 
consequences for the political, economic and social environment of a country. It affects the 
entire social fabric of a nation.2 Economically, corruption leads to the depletion of national 
wealth, an increase in the cost of goods and services, and to the conversion of public wealth 
into private and personal property. Politically, it impedes democracy and the rule of law. 
Socially, it leads to frustration among the public, which results in a weak civil society. The 
negative effects of corruption eventually widen the gap between the rich and the poor.3 
Corruption in one sector of the economy impedes development in all of them.4 
Corruption alters its character in response to changing socio-economic, cultural and political 
factors. All these factors affect corruption, and so does corruption affect them.5 Because of the 
multifaceted effects of corruption, a country may choose to respond to the problem in various 
ways. The most popular anti-corruption tools employed by states include signing and ratifying 
international anti-corruption legislation, drafting domestic legislation to help curb corruption 
and adopting policies to reform public administration, public expenditure management, 
procurement procedures, auditing procedures, and specific rules governing conflicts of 
interest.6 
Regulatory and institutional anti-corruption activity increased tremendously in the 1990s and 
included the rise of specialised anti-corruption bodies. Although the first such body was 
established in Singapore in October 1952 already, they became popular only in the last two 
                                                          
1 Bukovansky M (2006) 1. 
2 Doig & Theobald (2000) 1. 
3 Transparency International (2012). 
4 Amukowa (2013) 34. 
5 Doig & Riley (1998) 49. 
6 Heilbrunn (2004) 1. 
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decades.7 International actors such as the United Nations have played a key role in making anti-
corruption agencies a norm. Initiatives at the regional and international level have increased 
also. 
Kenya has not been left behind in this regard. As noted in Chapter One, it established the EACC 
to help curb corruption in the country. For the purposes of this research, the instruments 
forming the international anti-corruption legal framework will be reviewed to the extent that 
they apply to Kenya and call for the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies. 
This chapter will review also various regional and domestic legislation that affects the 
functioning of Kenya’s EACC. It will highlight the different standards which international legal 
instruments advocate, with a view to establishing a common standard for addressing 
corruption at the domestic level by using anti-corruption agencies. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the role of various stakeholders in the fight against corruption in Kenya. 
2.2 International Anti-Corruption Instruments 
2.2.1 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
On 9 December 2003, when UNCAC was opened for signature and ratification in the city of 
Merida in Mexico, Kenya became the first state party to the Convention.8 
Article 6(1) of the Convention provides, inter alia, that each state party shall ensure, as a matter 
of principle, the existence of a body or bodies that prevent corruption by such means as 
implementing policies and increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of 
corruption.9 Article 6(2) provides further that each state party shall grant its anti-corruption 
body or bodies: 
 the necessary autonomy and independence and shall ensure that the body or bodies are 
free from any undue influence; 
 the necessary material resources; 
                                                          
7 De Sousa (2009) 6. 
8 Afrimap (2015) 7. 
9 See Article 6(1) (a) & (b) of UNCAC.  
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 the specialised staff with the training needed to ensure that they carry out their 
functions. 
The spirit of Article 6 is expressed further in Article 36, which is a similar provision. However, 
the two articles differ in the sense that Article 6 aims at creating a body or bodies that prevent 
corruption while Article 36 calls for the existence of a body or bodies that combat corruption 
through law enforcement. 
It is necessary to note that Kenya’s main anti-corruption strategies were devised before the 
adoption of UNCAC. It is also worth recalling that the country’s anti-corruption legal and 
institutional framework dates back to the colonial era. Kenya’s responsibility under UNCAC is to 
ensure that the EACC is independent, well-resourced financially and provided with trained staff 
to help in the fight against corruption. 
Since the ratification of UNCAC, Kenya has adopted many anti-corruption initiatives within and 
outside the purview of the Convention. According to the 2009 gap analysis report, Kenya’s goal 
was to implement UNCAC fully before the end of the year 2012, in line with its medium-term 
plan under its Vision 2030.10 The report shows that Kenya has complied fully with a large 
number of measures required by UNCAC. For example, the country has passed laws that 
domesticate the Convention as a whole and has created a large number of offences specified in 
Chapter 3 of the Convention. The question that then lingers in one’s mind is why the levels of 
corruption in the country have not been reduced noticeably? 
2.2.2 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The AU Convention aims at establishing effective measures and actions to prevent, detect, 
punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa. Kenya not only has signed and 
ratified the AU Convention but also is in the process of implementing it.11 The AU Convention 
also forms part of the laws of Kenya under the Constitution of 2010.12 
                                                          
10 UNCAC Gap Analysis Report and Implementation Plan (2009). 
11 Afrimap (2015) 7. 
12 Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
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Article 5(3) of the AU Convention calls upon member states to “establish, maintain and 
strengthen independent national anti-corruption authorities or agencies”. Article 20 sets out a 
standard for the administration of anti-corruption agencies. It states that a national anti-
corruption authority shall be accorded the necessary independence and autonomy to enable it 
to perform its duties effectively.13 The article further provides that the agency should be 
specialised in combating corruption by, among other things, ensuring that the staff is trained 
and motivated to perform their duties successfully.14 
2.2.3 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
The SADC Protocol is open to member states of the Southern African Development Community 
and came into force in 2005. Article 4(1) (g) of the Protocol creates an obligation for states 
parties to create, maintain and strengthen institutions responsible for implementing 
mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corruption. Although the 
SADC Protocol does not affect Kenya directly, it has persuasive weight regarding the 
establishment, management, and administration of anti-corruption agencies. Kenya’s EACC has 
a similar operational structure to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes of 
Botswana, which is a member of SADC.15 
2.3 Domestic Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
2.3.1 Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
The Kenyan Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and was enacted on 27 August 2010 to 
replace the old Constitution that had been operative since Independence in 1963. It establishes 
the structure of the Kenyan government and defines the relationship between the government 
and the citizens of Kenya. 
  
                                                          
13 Article 20(4) of the AU Convention. 
14 Article 20(5) of the AU Convention. 
15 Report of the Task Force on the Review of the Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Fighting 
Corruption in Kenya (2015) 28. 
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Article 79 of the Constitution provides for the EACC in the following terms: 
Parliament shall enact legislation to establish an independent ethics and anti-corruption 
commission, which shall be and have the status and powers of a commission under 
chapter 15, for purposes of ensuring compliance with, and enforcement of, the 
provisions of this article. 
The Constitution stipulates further that the EACC shall be an independent and autonomous 
body, not subject to direction by any person or authority.16 It states also that parliament shall 
provide and allocate adequate funds to enable the EACC to perform its functions effectively.17 
The EACC is to consist of at least three but not more than nine members who are to be 
nominated according to national legislation, and who are to be appointed by the President with 
the approval of the National Assembly.  Article 250(6) (a) of the Constitution gives the members 
of the EACC a single term of six years in office.18  
The powers of the EACC to investigate public complaints, issue summons to witnesses and 
appoint its own members of staff are outlined in Article 252 of the Constitution. Article 253 
confers upon the EACC its corporate personality, along with the ability to sue and be sued in its 
own name. Further, under article 252(1) of the Constitution, the EACC is required to submit a 
report on any particular issue to the President and the National Assembly.  
It is important to note that Article 80 of the Constitution provides that parliament must enact 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Constitution. Article 70 of Chapter 
6 prescribes the constitutional standards of leadership and integrity in public office. It further 
sets out the responsibilities of leaders, provides for a code of conduct, prescribes the oaths of 
office, and lays down rules of financial probity in respect of state officers. In response, the 
National Assembly enacted the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (EACA) in 2011, 
which established the EACC to replace the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). 
  
                                                          
16 Article 249(2) (b) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
17 Article 249(3) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
18 See generally Article 250(1)-(12) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
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2.3.2 Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 201119 
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (EACA) not only establishes the EACC but also 
provides for its administration and codifies its functions and powers. Different aspects of this 
Act will be evaluated critically in the next chapter. 
2.3.3 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 
Enacted by Parliament to provide a legal framework for the fight against corruption and 
economic crimes in Kenya, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) creates and 
defines and punishes corruption and economic offences.20 It also provides for a number of 
strategies to be employed in the fight against corruption. These include investigation21 and 
asset recovery.22 
Section 16 of the ACECA establishes an Anti-Corruption Advisory Board and confers on the 
Board the function of advising the EACC on the exercise of its powers and the performance of 
its functions. 
Sections 23-28 of the Act generally provide the procedure for the EACC to use in conducting its 
investigations. The Act requires the EACC to report to the ODPP on the outcome of its 
investigations and to make recommendations as to whether a person is to be prosecuted for 
corruption.23 
2.3.4 Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004 
This Act is divided into six parts. Part I contains the preliminary provisions. Part II establishes 
specific codes of conduct.24 Part III establishes general codes of conduct and ethics for public 
officials.25 
This specific code calls for selflessness, financial probity, integrity, transparency, and 
accountability. The general codes in the Act call for instilling public confidence in public office, 
                                                          
19 Act No 22 of 2011. 
20 Section 2(1) of the ACECA. 
21 Section 24 of the ACECA. 
22 Section 55 of the ACECA.  
23 Section 35 of the ACECA. 
24 Section 5 of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004. 
25 Sections 7-25 of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004. 
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avoiding conflicts of interest, observing work hours, respecting constitutionalism and the rule of 
law and not compromising the public interest.
26 
Part IV is dedicated to the declaration of income, assets and liabilities by every public official.27 
Part V deals with enforcement of codes of conduct and ethics.28 The Act concludes with Part VI 
which contains the general provisions.29 
2.3.5 Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012 
This Act provides regulations that enforce standards of ethics and integrity amongst public 
entities, state officers and public officers.30 Its intention is to establish and give effect to 
procedures and mechanisms for the effective administration of Chapter 6 of the Constitution of 
Kenya.31 
2.4 Regional Ant-Corruption Institutions 
2.4.1 East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 
The East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA) was launched in 
November 2007 and the Kenyan EACC is a member.32 The vision of the EAAACA is to promote 
                                                          
26 Afrimap (2015) 19. 
27 Sections 26-34 of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004. 
28 Sections 35-39 of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004. 
29 Sections 40-42 of the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2004. 
30 Afrimap (2015) 17. The Act obligates state officers: to respect and abide by the Constitution and the law, 
and provides that the public trust and the authority and responsibility vested in a state officer must be 
exercised in the best interests of the people of Kenya; to take personal responsibility for the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of any acts or omissions arising from the discharge of the duties of the office; 
to carry out the duties of the office efficiently and honestly, and in a transparent and accountable 
manner; to observe, and subscribe to, ethical and professional requirements; not to use the office 
unlawfully  to enrich themselves or any other persons; not to engage in activities that amount to abuse of 
office; not to misuse public resources. 
31 Chapter 6 provides guiding principles on leadership and integrity including: selection on the basis of 
personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election in free and fair elections; objectivity and 
impartiality in decision-making, and in ensuring that decisions are not influenced by nepotism, 
favouritism, other improper motives or corrupt practices; selfless service based solely on the public 
interest, demonstrated by honesty in the execution of public duties;  the declaration of any personal 
interest that may conflict with public duties; accountability to the public for decisions and actions; and 
discipline and commitment in service to the people. 
32 Other members of the EAAACA include: Tanzania’s Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, 
Uganda’s Inspectorate of Government, Rwanda’s Office of the Ombudsman, Burundi’s Special Brigade of 
Anti-Corruption Commission, South Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Commission, Djibouti’s Inspector General, 
and Ethiopia’s Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. See Afrimap (2015). 
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the spirit of zero tolerance towards corruption and to encourage regional co-operation in 
preventing and combating corruption. Some of its objectives are:33 
 To promote, facilitate and regulate co-operation among the Partner States and to ensure the 
effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, investigate, punish and eradicate 
corruption; 
 To afford to one another mutual legal assistance regarding detection, investigations, 
prosecutions, identifications, tracing, freezing, seizure, confiscation, and repatriation of 
property, instruments or proceeds obtained or derived from corruption; 
 To conduct research on new and best practices and innovations to improve and enhance the 
effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Authorities in East African Region; 
 To stimulate public awareness about the dangers of corruption.34 
The EAAACA participated in the drafting of the East African Community Protocol on Prevention 
and Combating Corruption, the adoption of which its members are called upon to promote. 
The EAAACA conducts training for investigators from all its Partner States. The training offered 
is geared at specialisation in the investigation of corruption matters. By conducting research on 
new and best practices and innovations to improve and enhance the effectiveness of its Partner 
States, the EAAACA ensures that all bodies established by said states, including Kenya’s EACC, 
are keeping up with international standards on the management and administration of anti-
corruption commissions in the fight against corruption.35 
The aforementioned serves to strengthen the EAAACA’s legislative and institutional 
commitment to the fight against corruption not only at the domestic level but also at the 
regional level.36 
2.4.2 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
Corruption and money laundering enjoy a symbiotic relationship. The presence of one creates 
and facilitates the other. Corruption generates a substantial amount of criminal proceeds which 
has to be laundered.37 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)38 makes recommendations on 
                                                          
33 Kigali Communiqué at the EAAACA, 2013.  
34 Rutemarara (2011) 4. 
35 Rutemarara (2011) 7. 
36 Rutemarara (2011) 6. 
37 Chaikin & Sharma (2009) 1. 
38 The FATF is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of 
legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other 
 
 
 
 
27 
how countries can combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and these 
recommendations are important tools in the fight against corruption. The Eastern and Southern 
Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) is a regional FATF-styled body of which Kenya 
is a member.39 This means that the EACC implements the anti-corruption initiatives 
recommended by the FATF.40 
2.5 Other Stakeholders in the Fight against Corruption 
In 2003, under Kenya’s five-year national anti-corruption campaign, the government adopted a 
“zero tolerance to corruption” policy.41 Soon after adoption, it became evident that for this 
policy to be effective and for progress to be made in the war against corruption, there was a 
need for a radical transformation in the mindset of Kenyans. This realisation led to the 
formation of the following institutions. 
2.5.1 National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee 
The priority of the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee (NACSC) is to lead reform 
initiatives, among them the enactment and application of laws relating to corruption as well as 
the formulation of anti-corruption policies. In short, the NACSC is a civil society body that plays 
a leading role in fighting corruption through public education, sensitisation and awareness 
raising for the ordinary Kenyan. 
The mandate of the NACSC has been renewed regularly via various special gazette notices. 
Currently, the President has the power to establish the NACSC and to appoint its members.42 
The NACSC, in its campaigns, aims at effecting fundamental changes in the attitude, practice 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ 
(accessed 29 September 2016). 
39 FATF regional styled bodies disseminate FATF international standards in the different regions of the world. 
Its members and co-operating partners are available at http://www.esaamlg.org/mcp/index.php 
(accessed 29 September 2016). 
40 FATF recommendations are soft law. However, by virtue of the economic sanctions imposed on non-
compliant states, they are seen as “mandatory recommendations”. 
41 Transparency International (2013).  
42 See Gazette Notice No 6707 of 26 September 2014. 
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and culture of Kenyans regarding corruption.43 It is one of the key anti-corruption bodies and 
works closely with the EACC. 
Together with the EACC, the NACSC conducts campaigns to disseminate anti-corruption 
messages through the radio, television and local newspapers. These campaigns help to create 
awareness of corruption and to sensitise the public to corruption.44 The campaigns employ a 
value-based anti-corruption strategy with a view to promoting national values provided for 
under Article 10(2) of the Constitution of Kenya.45 The campaigns link the increased incidence 
of corruption to the non-practice of national values. They call upon members of the public to 
embrace and practice national values by refusing to participate in corrupt activities. 
In addition to public campaigns, the EACC and the NACSC conduct training of various anti-
corruption stakeholders within the national government46 who, in turn, conduct anti-corruption 
sensitisation of government officials at the county level. 
2.5.2 Office of the Director of Public Prosecution 
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP) plays one of the most important roles in 
the fight against corruption in Kenya. This role is linked to the fact that the EACC does not have 
prosecutorial powers. The primary function of the ODPP is to exercise state powers of 
prosecution, as provided for under Article 157(6) of the Constitution of Kenya. The ODPP 
institutes and undertakes criminal proceedings against any person. Further, under Article 
157(9) of the Constitution, the ODPP may instruct any other prosecutor to institute criminal 
proceedings. 
  
                                                          
43 NACSC Vision, Mission and Mandate, available at http://www.naccsc.go.ke/index.php/about-us/vision-
mission-mandate (accessed 29 September 2016). 
44 NACSC Progress Report (2015) 4. 
45 Some of the national values include good governance, transparency, accountability, integrity and 
patriotism. 
46 For example, the County Anti-Corruption Civilian Oversight Committee  that is in charge of conducting 
anti-corruption sensitisation amongst members of the county assembly. See NACSC Progress Report 
(2015) 5. 
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The ODPP and the EACC co-operate when it comes to matters corruption.47 Once the EACC 
finalises its investigations and concludes that a case warrants prosecution, it will send the file 
and a report to the ODPP recommending the matter for prosecution. The decision to prosecute 
is vested solely in the ODPP. The ODPP has the discretion to initiate the prosecution of a matter 
investigated by the EACC, to return the file to the EACC for further investigation or to 
recommend the closure of the file.48 The ODPP issues guidelines on the prosecution of 
investigated cases. This ensures that any decisions made regarding the prosecution of 
corruption are underpinned by unified standards.49 
In order to enhance the quality of the prosecution of corruption and economic crimes, the 
ODPP produces various reports and guidelines to elaborate the framework on the prosecutorial 
process, from pre-trial to appeals level. The ODPP has the power to direct and guide the EACC 
to investigate alleged corruption crimes.50 The EACC is bound to follow the advice of the ODPP 
as to the nature of charges and the conduct of the prosecution. The ODPP and the EACC co-
operate during pre-trial conferencing and preparation of witnesses. The two have a joint case 
management system that enables both institutions to track files moving between them.51 
The ODPP and the EACC hold monthly meetings to discuss, evaluate and address issues 
regarding on-going investigations and prosecutions. The meetings give them a platform to 
discuss administrative and legislative challenges and any other matter of mutual interest.52 
  
                                                          
47 Afrimap (2015) 36. 
48 ODPP Report on Organisational Structure and Staffing Levels (2015) 2. 
49 Guidelines for prosecuting corruption and economic crimes seek to generate and sustain a good working 
relationship between the EACC and the ODPP. They also assist in determining whether criminal 
proceedings should be commenced, what charges should be brought before court, and whether 
commenced proceedings should be continued or discontinued. See www.odpp.go.ke (accessed 28 
September 2016).  
50 Section 5(2)(b) of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 2013. 
51 Afrimap (2015) 36.  
52 Guidelines for Prosecuting Corruption and Economic Crimes, available at www.odpp.go.ke (accessed 28 
September 2016). 
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2.5.3 Commission on Administrative Justice 
Commonly known as the office of the Ombudsman, the Commission was created by the 
Commission on Administrative Justice Act of 2011.53 The Commission enjoys constitutional 
safeguards, powers, and functions similar to those enjoyed by commissions established under 
Chapter 15 of the Constitution of Kenya.54 
The Commission draws its mandate from the Constitution and the Commission on 
Administrative Justice Act.55 Its functions include the investigation of improper conduct and 
abuse of power in the public service. It promotes constitutionalism and the adoption of Kenyan 
national values within state organs. Its investigatory role complements that of the EACC. 
2.5.4 Public Procurement Oversight Authority56 
The Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA) is responsible for ensuring the soundness 
of the country’s procurement system.57 It not only implements and monitors laws relating to 
public procurement but also offers advice and training on matters of procurement. It helps in 
the fight against corruption by protecting the integrity of the tendering and procurement 
process. 
2.5.5 Controller of Budget 
The work of the Controller of Budget is critical to preventing and combating corruption. The 
main mandate of the Controller of Budget is to oversee implementation of the national budget 
and to authorise withdrawals from public funds after ascertaining that such withdrawals are 
permitted by law. The Controller submits reports to the National Assembly on implementation 
of the budget.58 In the case of misuse of funds allocated in the budget, the Controller of Budget 
can formulate appropriate recommendations for action by the EACC. 
                                                          
53 Section 3(1) of the Commission on Administrative Justice Act establishes the Commission. 
54 See Sections 4, 5(a) & 5(b) of the Commission on Administrative Justice Act. 
55 See Article 252 of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 8 of the Commission on Administrative Justice 
Act. 
56 Established under Section 8(1) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005. 
57 Transparency International “Overview of Kenya Corruption and Anti-Corruption” (2012). 
58 Task Force Report (2015) 43. 
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2.5.6 Office of the Auditor General 
The core mandate of the Office of the Auditor General is to monitor the governmental financial 
management and to carry out audits of all governmental entities and public sector companies 
in the country.59 
2.5.7 Role of the President in the Fight against Corruption 
Under the Constitution, the President of the Republic of Kenya plays a critical role in the fight 
against corruption. He leads in providing the necessary political will for fighting corruption and 
setting the country’s agenda for good governance and anti-corruption.60 
The President is required to report to the nation once every year on the measures taken and 
the progress achieved in the realisation of Kenya’s national values.61 It is worth noting that the 
national values include accountability, integrity, good governance and transparency. 
The EACC, in terms of Article 254(1) of the Constitution, is required to make reports at the end 
of every financial year to the President and to Parliament. 
2.5.8 The Judiciary 
The anti-corruption strategy employed by Kenya is such that the EACC investigates, the ODPP 
prosecutes and the judiciary adjudicates cases of corruption and economic crimes.62 The 
Constitution establishes the judiciary as an independent custodian of justice in Kenya. Its 
primary role is to exercise judicial authority over the people of Kenya.63 The Chief Justice is 
charged with the responsibility of appointing special magistrates to adjudicate prosecutions 
involving corruption and economic crimes.64 
  
                                                          
59 Task Force Report (2015) 41. 
60 Task Force Report (2015) 17. 
61 Article 132(1) (c) (I ) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
62 Task Force Report (2015) 28. 
63 See generally Chapter 10 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
64 Section 3(1)(a) of Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003). 
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2.6 Role of Non-State Actors in the Fight against Corruption 
A successful war against corruption requires that the role of non-state actors such as the media, 
civil society, religious organisations and the private sector in the anti-corruption agenda is 
credited. This role is recognised under the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP). The NACP 
provides a co-ordinated and unified approach to the fight against corruption. It acknowledges 
the participation and co-operation of all Kenyans. Further, it provides an environment that 
enables different stakeholders to contribute to the anti-corruption agenda.65 The NACP 
recognises the role of the media in exposing corruption and in keeping the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary and the public sector carefully monitored for corruption 
malpractices.66 The civil society organisations create and mobilise pressure for reforms. The 
government partners with civil society in disseminating information, and in creating and 
increasing public awareness of anti-corruption.67 
2.7 Conclusion 
The establishment of anti-corruption bodies has enjoyed significant legislative support. Various 
international and regional legal instruments require their member states to establish 
specialised bodies to fight and prevent corruption. As discussed above, besides ratifying the 
international and regional anti-corruption instruments, Kenya has enacted various domestic 
statutes to strengthen the EACC’s fight against corruption. 
However, merely strengthening legislation that governs institutions is not sufficient to control 
corruption effectively. Mechanisms need to be put in place to secure the necessary funding and 
resources implement anti-corruption legislation and to train the persons managing the anti-
corruption institutions. 
The next chapter will review the mechanisms designed to enhance the performance of the 
EACC in preventing and fighting corruption. 
 
                                                          
65 National Anti-Corruption Plan, available at www.eacc.go.ke/Docs/Ntional%20Anti-
%Corruption%20plan.pdf (accessed 28 August 2016). 
66 National Anti-Corruption Plan 25. 
67 National Anti-Corruption Plan 26. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The causes of corruption differ from one country to another and the various systems have 
different ways of handling corruption.1 However, if there is a common feature across different 
countries, it has been the establishment and development of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) 
over the years.2 De Sousa defines an ACA as: 
A public (funded) body of a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight corruption and 
reduce the opportunity structures propitious for its occurrence in society through preventive 
and/or repressive measures.3 
Regarding ACAs as the ultimate institutional response to corruption, De Sousa argues that some 
of the earliest agencies were born as a response to the first wave of corruption scandals in the 
1980s and early 1990s.4 Subsequently, ACAs have continued to mushroom throughout the 
world. Their establishment follows a perceived failure of conventional law enforcement bodies 
such as the police and the judiciary or they are the product of legal and institutional responses 
to the challenges of corruption. 
There appears to be an incessant call for the establishment of these specialised agencies at 
both the regional and international levels. This is evident in the common provisions of UNCAC 
and the AU Convention, as well as of various domestic and regional laws and bodies. The 
                                                          
1 Babu R (2006) 3. 
2 Heilbrunn (2004) 2. 
3 De Sousa (2010) 1. 
4 These early agencies either were created by the declining European powers as an attempt to clean up 
the not-so- clean reputation of their colonial administrators or were put in place by the newly 
independent governments as part of their political agenda within the framework of self-determination. 
See De Sousa (2010) 1. 
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popularity of the ACA suggests that the institution plays a critical role in anti-corruption 
strategy.5 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the motive 
behind the establishment of specialised ACAs is the expectation that, unlike other state 
institutions, such agencies will not be tainted by political influence, can centralise information 
and intelligence about corruption, and can assert leadership in the anti-corruption agenda.6 
Regrettably, despite their steady development, very few ACAs succeed.7 Reasons for their 
failure include lack of independence from other arms of government, inadequate funds to 
conduct their investigations, lack of political will to enable them to fulfil their mandate, lack of 
public trust, and poor staffing. 
This chapter will discuss different models of ACAs in an attempt to classify Kenya’s EACC. Where 
relevant, examples of successful ACAs will be cited in order to highlight factors which contribute 
to the effective administration and operation of ACAs in general. 
The chapter will discuss also international best practice standards on promoting and 
strengthening the effectiveness of ACAs. Further, factors that may bolster the functioning of 
ACAs, as proposed by the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, will be 
considered. 
  
                                                          
5 Despite varying in scope, legal status, membership and implementation mechanisms they all aim at 
establishing common standards for addressing corruption through establishment of anti-corruption 
institutions. OECD (2008) 17. 
6 They help overcome the inefficiency of conventional law enforcement agencies in coping with the 
growing sophistication of corrupt mechanisms and transactions. OECD (2008) 23. 
7 Heilbrunn (2004) 2. 
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3.2 Drivers of Success for ACAs 
3.2.1 Choosing the Right Model of ACA 
Analysts classify ACAs differently, depending on their functions and the arm of government to 
which they report.8 For example, the OECD classifies agencies into three categories, based on 
their different purposes viewed through their functions. First are the multi-purpose agencies 
which have preventive and repressive powers. They are involved in policy analysis, counseling 
and technical assistance, information dissemination, ethics monitoring and training. Second are 
the law enforcement type agencies which combine detection, investigation and prosecution in 
one body. They may also incorporate prevention, co-ordination and research functions. The 
third model includes the preventive, policy development and co-ordination agencies which 
focus on one or more corruption prevention functions. 
Nothwithstanding the existence of several types of ACAs, there is no universally accepted 
model which constitutes a one-size-fits-all remedy and which can be transposed from one 
country to the other. The success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption 
and the Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau have attracted and encouraged 
attempts by most countries developing new ACAs to replicate these models almost in their 
entirety.9 
However, this practice has attracted a lot of criticism. For example, Doig argues that the 
problems faced by most ACAs in developing countries are associated with the apparent success 
of the Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). According to him, 
agencies that are modelled after the Hong Kong Commission carry a great weight of 
expectation but often are poorly designed and malfunctioning agencies in more hostile political 
and economic environments. To make matter worse, the agencies commonly are given a vague 
and broad remit covering investigation, prosecution, prevention and education. They usually 
lack the capacity and resources to perform any one of those functions well. Therefore, mission 
                                                          
8 Heilbrunn (2004) 3 differentiates amongst four types of anti-corruption commissions: the universal 
model with investigative, preventive and communicative function; the investigative model that has 
investigations as its primary function; the parliamentary model which accounts to parliament; and the 
multi-agency model that involves a range of agencies which work together to fight corruption.  
9 Doig et al (2007) 252. 
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overload and diversification make failure almost inevitable.10 Moreover, institutional 
transplants from foreign systems are likely to fail if they do not adapt to a country’s social, 
cultural, historical, political and legal background. Thus, before establishing an ACA, a country 
needs to make a realistic assessment of the organisational maturity, capacity and 
environmental constraints in order to make sure that the ACA fits functionally within the local 
context.11 
Anti-corruption agencies need to be specialised. Specialisation takes different forms and is 
achieved through the different functions of an ACA. It is the responsibility of individual 
countries to find the most effective institutional solution appropriate to the local context, level 
of corruption and existing national institutional and legal framework.12 In an attempt to 
specialise the fight against corruption, Kenya’s EACC was modelled after the multi-purpose 
agency. In Hong Kong, ICAC investigates cases while the Department of Justice undertakes the 
prosecutions.13 The Kenyan arrangement mirrors Hong Kong in that the EACC investigates 
allegations of corruption and the ODPP prosecutes certain of the cases investigated. 
3.2.2 Legal Framework 
The first key element in the establishment of a successful ACA is ensuring that the necessary 
legal framework exists. Without the legal tools needed to pursue venal officials, an ACA cannot 
succeed.14 It needs a proper and stable legal framework that establishes, maintains and 
regulates its powers and functions. The laws must deal with such matters as the main attributes 
of the agency, its powers and its accountability structures.15 
The nation’s legal and constitutional configuration should be examined with a view to removing 
any barriers that may exist, including any conflicts of interests between the new agency and 
existing institutions. The ACA should be founded upon the rule of law and the constitutional 
                                                          
10 Doig, Watt & Williams (2005) 6. 
11 OECD (2008) 24. 
12 OECD (2008) 23. 
13 Task Force Report (2015) 27. 
14 Heilbrunn (2004) 15. 
15 EPAC/EACN (2011) 3. 
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principle of legality in order to safeguard its permanence. This will help it survive political 
turbulence and ad hoc legislation that may be annulled easily. 
In Kenya, Section 3 of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, Section 6 of the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and Article 79 of the Constitution collectively establish the 
Commission. These legislative provisions not only warrant the permanence of the EACC, but 
they also provide, inter alia, for its functions, mandate, independence, appointment procedures 
and reporting structure. 
3.2.3 Independence 
For an ACA to be successful it must be independent. UNCAC considers an agency independent 
when it is free from all undue influence, and has the necessary material resources and 
specialised staff, as well as the capacity to provide the training required by the staff to carry out 
their functions.16 
A successful ACA is dependent upon insulation from politics. The agency must be able to 
operate without interference from the executive and the legislature, as well as from other 
authorities. When an agency is seen to be independent it achieves legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. The staff of the agency must be protected from possible reprisal or fear of reprisal. The 
institutional setting and the organisational structure of an agency must permit independent and 
impartial work.17 Independence should be protected both in law and in practice. Legislation 
should establish, for example, accountability mechanisms between the executive and those 
charged with the responsibility of managing the agency. It should also outline procedures 
relating to the appointment and removal of the agency’s top executives.18 
An agency should enjoy the kind of political and operational independence which allows for the 
investigation even of those at the highest level of government.19 However, the difficulties of 
                                                          
16 Article 6(2) of UNCAC. 
17 EPAC/EACN (2011) 3. 
18 Gregory (2005) 127-128. According to EPAC/EACN (2011) 22-23, independence includes transparent 
recruitment based on merit, ability to make decisions on investigations without any interference, and 
ability to co-operate and liaise with similar organisations without the need for prior consultation or 
approval. 
19 Pope & Vogl (2000) 8. 
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securing complete independence from outside intervention must be faced. The work of ACAs 
often excites and elicits political concerns, and hence great political pressure. It is impossible to 
expect the law fully to eliminate areas of possible undue influence, especially through backdoor 
channels.20 
3.2.4 Accountability Mechanism 
The independence of ACAs ought not to be absolute. Whilst it is necessary to allow them to 
operate without undue influence from other authorities, they nonetheless need to be 
accountable for their work. The system must allow for the checks and balances essential to 
democratic governance.21 There should be internal and external oversight of their work and 
performance. An ACA should be accountable for how it discharges its duties and for how it 
conducts itself. Accountability ensures public confidence and cushions the agency from 
suspicions of impropriety that may be levied against it by its enemies.22 
Accountability can reside in the requirement that an ACA submits annual reports and/or 
internal and external audits of its performance to the executive, the legislature or a specialised 
committee. For example, the New South Wales ICAC operates under the supervision of two 
committees, a Parliamentary Joint Committee and an Operations Review Committee.23 
Accountability should be tailored to suit the powers and functions of the agency. 
Accountability and independence reinforce each other and should be used for the proper 
governance and administration of the ACA. Accountability may be classified as either external 
or internal. Internal accountability is where agencies develop and establish clear rules and 
standard operating procedures, including monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, to minimise 
any misconduct and abuse of power by its members. External accountability requires that the 
                                                          
20 Gregory (2005) 127-128. 
21 OECD (2008) 26. 
22 EPAC/EACN (2011) 4. 
23 See Heilbrunn (2004) 8 & 15. 
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agency strictly adheres to the rule of law and be accountable in terms of mechanisms 
established to prevent any abuse of power.24 
3.2.5 Financial and Human Resources 
The need to have ACAs adequately funded and suitably staffed cannot be overemphasised. The 
proper financing of ACAs is an obligation placed on states by international legal instruments. In 
order for an agency to perform its functions efficiently and effectively, the amount of funds 
allocated to it must be commensurate with its size and objectives.25 Lack of resources invariably 
hinders the performance of an ACA. This, in turns, lowers the level of public confidence in the 
institution.26 An sufficiently financed agency will allow for the employment of well-trained staff 
with appropriate remuneration packages.27 
3.2.6 Recruitment and Appointment of Staff 
The staff of an ACA should be highly qualified individuals, possessing the relevant skills, training, 
and experience.28 In order to foster and increase public confidence in the establishment and 
work of an ACA, appointments should be objective, transparent and merit-based. Appointment 
of top management should be based on high-level consensus on the candidates selected by 
different power holders.29 There should be public involvement in every stage of the process. 
The staff of the agency must be trained regularly in a wide range of skills needed for them to be 
able to fight corruption. Personnel should enjoy job security founded in law and removal from 
office of heads of ACAs should occur through legally established procedures.30 Removals should 
not be politically instigated. Such safeguards will protect the agency personnel against 
unfounded dismissals. 
  
                                                          
24 Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (2012). 
25 OSCE (2016) 50. 
26 OECD (2008) 27. 
27 EPAC/EACN (2011) 7. 
28 EPAC/EACN (2011) 8. 
29 OECD (2008) 26. 
30 Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (2012). 
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3.2.7 Integrity 
Members of the ACA need to set an example regarding the values they seek to promote and 
enforce. This can be done through the adoption of codes of conduct requiring the highest 
standards of ethical behaviour from agency staff.31 Values such as honesty and integrity should 
be employed by agency personnel in the discharge of their duties. 
3.2.8 Collaboration and Co-operation 
ACAs are part of the institutional framework designed to fight corruption. They should not 
operate in isolation as they share their competencies with other government agencies. An 
institutional framework which lacks the support of other key stakeholders will fail.32 Therefore, 
ACAs should have a good working relationship with the media and civil society, as well as with 
other state agencies such as the police and the judiciary.33 
Through smooth and fruitful co-operation, an agency can, in a timely manner, obtain quality 
information and data; access operational support and joint investigative activities; gather 
intelligence and evidence related to corruption offences including, where appropriate, the 
identification and recovery of the proceeds of corruption. Co-operation should facilitate the 
exchange of best practice, standards, experiences and lessons learned. It also represents a 
safety net and a mutual support network for the agency in the face of difficulties.34 
UNCAC recognises the importance of co-operation and calls for the participation of civil society, 
non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations in the prevention of and 
the fight against corruption.35 Also, ACAs should enter into international co-operation networks 
to help address the growing sophistication and globalisation of corruption transactions.36 
  
                                                          
31 Integrity can be achieved through use of code of ethics, code of conduct, mission statement, best 
practice or other instruments. See EPAC/EACN (2011) 5. 
32 OECD (2008) 28. 
33 Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (2012). 
34 EPAC/EACN (2011) 8. 
35 See generally Article 13 of UNCAC. 
36 Co-operation and collaboration help in knowledge transfer across different institutions through 
formation of groups, such as the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, which 
organise training for anti-corruption officials and conduct seminars and conferences that are good 
networking opportunities for sharing best practice standards. See De Sousa (2009) 8. 
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3.2.9 Mandate Competencies 
There are numerous ways to fight corruption, and therefore ACAs have a broad range of 
activities in which they can engage.37 They can adopt various methods that may include anti-
corruption policy development and co-ordination, research and analysis, public outreach 
activities (including education and awareness raising), monitoring, and investigation and 
prosecution of corruption cases. The ACA should have a clear and well-defined mandate to 
enable it tackle corruption.38 Lack of mandate clarity creates turf wars between different 
institutions purporting to perform similar functions. 
3.2.10 Political Will 
The success of an ACA largely depends on the political will of the government to fight 
corruption. Where there is low level of political commitment to reduce corruption there is likely 
to be a high level of political resistance to anti-corruption initiatives. Political will fosters a good 
working relationship between state agencies, the private sector and the ACA. It ensures, among 
other things, that an agency has the necessary resources, accountability mechanisms, 
independence and personnel to fight corruption. Political support should not come only from 
the presidency but also from all top political leaders in a country.39 Lack of political support robs 
an ACA of its ability to obtain mutual legal assistance in areas such as the extradition and asset 
recovery. 
3.2.11 Availability of Key Performance Indicators 
ACAs need to have appropriate, accurate and adequate methods of measuring their 
performance. 
Processes of performance measurement based upon injudiciously-chosen performance 
indicators have not only resulted in the inaccurate assessment of anti-corruption agencies’ 
“success” but have led anti-corruption agencies in the direction of “failure”.40 
                                                          
37 OSCE (2016) 47. 
38 Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (2012). 
39 Doing, Watt & Williams (2005) 12 & 42. 
40 Doing, Watt & Williams (2005) 40. 
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The methods of measuring their performance need to be commensurate with the work they 
perform. Assessments should focus on outputs, turnover of staff and length of programmes, 
and the impact of programmes in the longer term. The objectives of an agency need to be 
reviewed annually in order to establish its success or otherwise. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The best practice standards discussed in this chapter are not comprehensive. They are limited 
to the factors stipulated in the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies. 
Various other factors could be cited to enhance the performance of ACAs. It is worth 
mentioning that there is no legally binding instrument that provides for best practice standards. 
However, lessons from successful ACAs indicate that applying some of the above elements and 
recommendations will enhance performance. The next chapter will introduce and discuss the 
structure of the EACC and the extent to which it adheres to the standards discussed in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION OF KENYA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Corruption remains a big problem in Africa. Indices, such as those of Transparency 
International, highlight African countries as poor performers in reducing corruption. 
Nevertheless, the reliance upon anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in the fight against corruption 
in Africa has continued to grow over the years. It thus is imperative to analyse Kenya’s EACC in 
order to assess its role in the fight against corruption. 
This chapter will examine the organisational structure of the EACC. Different features, including 
the appointment of it executives and members of staff, its powers and duties, its 
independence, its accountability and its funding will be discussed. The chapter will conclude by 
considering the achievements of the Commission in its fight against corruption. 
4.2 Organisational Structure of the EACC 
As discussed in the previous chapter,1 the EACC is modelled after the OECD’s multi-purpose 
agency with preventive and repressive powers. The top management of the EACC consists of a 
Chairperson and two Commissioners. The Commission has a secretariat that is headed by a 
Secretary and two Deputy Secretaries, with one deputy acting as the Director of Technical 
Services and the other as Director of Corporate Services.2 It also has staff recruited by the EACC 
itself, staff from its predecessor institution (the KACC) and staff seconded from the Public 
Service Commission at the request of the EACC.3 The members of staff are spread across 
different departments, namely, investigations, asset recovery, prevention and education; 
finance and planning; and human resource and administration. The Commission’s Secretary is 
its chief executive officer and accounting officer and is responsible for carrying out of the 
                                                          
1 See §3.2.1 above. 
2 Reporting to the Director of Technical Services are Directors of Preventive Services, Legal Services, 
Investigations Ethics and Leadership. The Director of Corporate Services oversees Directors of Finance and 
Planning and of Human Resources and Administration. See EACC Annual Report (2014-2015) 13. 
3 Task Force Report (2015) 22. 
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decisions of the Commission, the day-to-day administration and management of the affairs of 
the Commission, and the supervision of other employees of the Commission, as well as the 
performance of such other duties as may be assigned by the Commission.4 Kenya has forty-
seven counties. The Commission has its headquarters in Nairobi city and it has nine regional 
offices spread across the counties of the Republic. 
4.3 Mandate, Powers, and Duties of the EACC 
The EACC has a clear and well-defined mandate that helps it fight corruption. Its powers and 
duties are derived from Article 252 of the Constitution, from Sections 11 and 13 of the Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission Act and from the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. 
Article 252 of the Constitution gives the EACC the power to: 
 conduct investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint made by a member of the 
public; 
 use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as conciliation, mediation, and 
negotiation; 
 recruit its own staff; 
 perform any function and exercise any powers prescribed by legislation, in addition to 
the functions and powers conferred by this Constitution; and 
 summon witnesses to assist with investigations and institute court proceedings. 
In addition, the Commission can monitor the practices and procedures of public bodies to 
detect corrupt practices and to amend methods of work or procedures that may be conducive 
to corrupt practices. 
(a) Alongside the Constitutional provisions, Section 11 of the EACCA provides for the  
following functions of the Commission: in relation to state officers— 
(i) develop and promote standards and best practices in integrity and anti-corruption;  
(ii) develop a code of ethics;  
(b) Work with other State and public offices in the development and promotion of standards and 
best practices in integrity and anti-corruption; 
(c) Receive complaints on the breach of the code of ethics by public officers;  
                                                          
4 Section 16(1)-(7) of the EACCA. 
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(d) Investigate and recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions the prosecution of any acts of 
corruption or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed by this Act or any other law 
enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution;  
(e) Recommend appropriate action to be taken against State officers or public officers alleged to 
have engaged in unethical conduct;  
(f) Oversee the enforcement of codes of ethics prescribed for public officers;  
(g) Advise, on its own initiative, any person on any matter within its functions; 
(h) Raise public awareness on ethical issues and educate the public on the dangers of corruption 
and enlist and foster public support in combating corruption but with due regard as to 
confidentiality; 
(i) Monitor the practices and procedures of public bodies to detect corrupt practices and to secure 
the revision of methods of work or procedures that may be conducive to corrupt practices; and 
(j) Institute and conduct proceedings in court for purposes of the recovery or protection of public 
property, or for the freeze or confiscation of proceeds of corruption or related to corruption, or 
the payment of compensation, or other punitive and disciplinary measures. 
Section 13 of the EACCA empowers the Commission to: 
(a) educate and create awareness on any matter within the Commission’s mandate;  
(b) undertake preventive measures against unethical and corrupt practices; 
(c) conduct investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint made by any person; and 
(d) conduct mediation, conciliation and negotiation. 
From the powers and duties listed above, it is evident that the EACC is tasked with fighting 
corruption through investigations, prevention, education, alternative dispute resolution and 
asset recovery. 
4.3.1 Investigations 
The Commission conducts investigations of its own accord or upon receipt of a complaint from 
a member of the public.5 The Commissioners enjoy the powers, privileges and immunities of 
police officers for any investigations they undertake. The findings of such investigations are 
admissible in court and can be used also for asset recovery and compensation.6 In discharging 
its investigatory function, the Commission employs integrity tests for officials as well as 
“tap”and “sting” operations in which investigators stage-manage the payment of bribes to 
officials who ask for them.7 
  
                                                          
5 Section 24 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003. 
6 EACC Annual Report (2012/2013) 4. 
7 EACC Report of Activities 2014/2015. 
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4.3.2 Prevention 
The Commission prevents corruption by examining systems, policies, procedures and practices 
in public and private sector agencies with a view to identifying corruption loopholes and 
recommending measures for sealing such loopholes. It also offers training to integrity assurance 
officers in the public and private sectors. Further, the Commission develops codes of conduct 
and helps institutions form corruption prevention committees. Upon request, the Commission 
offers advisory services to organisations, agencies, departments and other institutions on anti-
corruption and good governance measures. 
4.3.3 Education 
The Commission is charged with the mandate of educating the public on the dangers of 
corruption. It also designs, develops and implements ethics and integrity programmes to be 
applied in all public and private educational institutions. Similarly, it develops and circulates 
anti-corruption information and communication materials throughout the country and carries 
out anti-corruption research. The findings of the research are published in reports which inform 
the country’s anti-corruption strategy.8 
4.3.4 Asset Recovery 
The EACC conducts asset tracing investigations involving property, land and money. It uses non-
conviction based asset recovery by instituting civil proceedings on behalf of public and private 
bodies to recover benefits improperly obtained by third parties. The Commission also seeks 
preservation orders from the court to ensure that the assets under investigation are not sold, 
disposed of or transferred. 
4.3.5 Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
The Commission employs mediation, conciliation and negotiation to settle less contentious civil 
matters. As a result, substantial amounts of stolen assets have been recovered.9 
                                                          
8 EACC Annual Report (2012/2013) 3.  
9 EACC Annual Report (2012/2013) 6. 
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Amnesty has been used by the EACC to settle some corruption cases. This allows suspects, who 
have been involved in corrupt practices, to come forward and seek immunity from prosecution 
on condition that they disclose all facts pertaining to their corrupt acts and the benefits arising 
from such acts and that they return and surrender their illegally acquired assets.10 
4.3.6 Summation 
The country has adopted a multi-agency approach to fighting corruption, with the functions of 
the Commission running through different legislative provisions. There is clear duplication in 
the aforesaid provisions. The absence of an overarching statute may pose a challenge to the 
performance of the Commission’s tasks, especially those that require co-ordination across 
various agencies. The EACC has a clear mandate regarding prevention, education and 
sensitisation of the public on corruption matters and asset recovery. However, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, it lacks prosecutorial powers. The inability of the Commission to 
prosecute persons for corruption crimes is criticised constantly as the weak link in its fight 
against corruption. 
Overcoming the EACC’s lack of prosecutorial powers requires co-ordination of the activities of 
the various agencies involved in the performance of the different anti-corruption functions. 
However, achieving collaboration between the traditional law enforcement agencies and the 
EACC may be a tall order. 
4.4 Staff Recruitment and Tenure 
The appointment of the Chairperson, the two Commissioners, and the Secretary of the EACC 
occurs pursuant to the Constitution of Kenya, the EACCA and the Public Appointments 
(Parliamentary Approval) Act. 
                                                          
10 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes (Amnesty and Restitution) Regulation L.N 4 2011. 
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The Constitution requires that for a person to be appointed as Chairperson of, Member of or 
Secretary to the Commission, he must meet the requirements of the principles of leadership 
and integrity as contained in Article 73(2).11 
The qualifications for appointment as Chairperson, Commissioners and Secretary are found in 
Section 5 of the EACCA. They are essentially similar, with the major difference being that the 
Chairperson must have knowledge and experience of not less than fifteen years while the 
Commissioners and Secretary must have at least ten years’ experience. The rest of the 
requirements include being a holder of at least a degree from a university recognised in Kenya 
and having a distinguished career.12 Members of a governing body of a political party, 
undischarged bankrupts, felons and persons removed from public office for contravening the 
Constitution or any laws of Kenya are not eligible for appointment.13 
The procedure for the appointment of the current Chairperson and Members of the 
Commission are outlined in Section 6 of the EACCA. It includes the President constituting a 
selection panel,14 which will advertise the positions of Chairperson and Commissioners in two 
local daily newspapers, inviting applications from persons who qualify for nomination and 
appointment to the office. The panel then considers the applications received, shortlists 
candidates and publishes the names of those shortlisted in the daily newspaper, inviting them 
for interviews. After conducting the interviews, the panel recommends three applicants for the 
post of Chairperson and three for the post of Members of the Commission, and forwards its 
recommendations to the President. 
                                                          
11 They include: (a) selection on the basis of personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election in 
free and fair elections; (b) objectivity and impartiality in decision making, and in ensuring that decisions 
are not influenced by nepotism, favoritism, other improper motives or corrupt practices; (c) selfless 
service based solely on the public interest, demonstrated by (i) honesty in the execution of public duties; 
and (ii) the declaration of any personal interest that may conflict with public duties; (d) accountability to 
the public for decisions and actions; and (e) discipline and commitment in service to the people. 
12 See Section 5(1)(c) of the EACCA. 
13 See Section 5(3) of the EACCA. 
14 The selection panel consists of members from each of the following bodies: the Office of the President; 
the Office of the Prime Minister; the Ministry responsible for ethics and integrity; the Judicial Service 
Commission; the Commission for the time being responsible for matters relating to human rights; the 
Commission for the time being responsible for matters relating to gender; the Media Council of Kenya; 
the joint forum of religious organisations and the Association of Professional Societies of East Africa. 
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The President selects the Chair and Commissioners from the names forwarded to him by the 
panel and then transmits his selections to the National Assembly for approval. The National 
Assembly conducts approval hearings under the Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) 
Act, which lays down criteria for the vetting and approval of nominees for appointment to 
public office by parliament.15 Section 7 of the EACCA affords the Chair and members of the 
Commission a term of six years in office.16  The six-year term of office is intended to grant the 
Commission’s officers security and stability.   
The Commission’s staff are appointed on renewable contracts. Their appointment procedure 
follows a robust human resources and administrative process. The approved staff of the EACC 
numbers 2 246. However, as of June 2015, the Commission is reported to have a staff of only 
440.17  It is submitted that this staff shortage hampers the work of the EACC and leads to a 
backlog in the investigation of cases. However, the appointment procedure of the EACC staff is 
transparent and there are enough legislative guidelines to ensure meritorious appointments. 
4.5 Capacity 
The Commission’s headquarters are in the country’s capital, Nairobi. In addition, the 
Commission has a regional body in five different counties. However, this is not ideal since the 
Constitution of 2010 provides for a devolved government.18 This has resulted in the 
decentralisation of public resources and functions of state organs.19 In the allocation of 
functions provided in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the functions of the anti-
corruption have been omitted. The Constitution is unclear as to which between the central and 
county governments has the mandate to carry out anti-corruption functions.  
                                                          
15 Sections 6 and 7 of Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) Act. 
16 Following the enactment of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Amendment) Act in 2015, the 
recruitment procedure of EACC staff members has changed. The amendment vests the responsibility to 
recruit the Chairperson and Commissioners in the Public Service Commission, as opposed to a Selection 
Panel, after which names of qualified candidates are forwarded to the President for consideration. The 
names of President’s preferred candidates are transmitted to Parliament for approval, after which the 
President would appoint the approved candidates. See Task Force Report (2015) 21. 
17 Task Force Report (2015) 22. 
18 Afrimap (2015) 29. 
19 Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
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For the fight against corruption to be effective, the staff of the Commission requires adequate 
training. The EACC indicates in its annual reports that it was involved in the training of its staff 
in collaboration with the government and other agencies such as the World Bank.20  A critical 
analysis of the training shows that it is ad hoc and only initiated at the request of employees 
who are seeking to obtain professional accreditation. For example, investigators and 
prosecutors who are also advocates are required to attend the Council of Legal Education 
training courses in order to renew their practicing certificates. The reports of the Commission 
indicating where the training took place and the attendees reveal that lawyers and accountants 
attend training offered by their professional bodies.21 
Clearly, there is a huge gap in the capacity of the Commission’s staff. There is a need to 
enhance the skills of the staff members at a practical level. 
4.6 Integrity 
In order to lead in the war against graft, the Commission and its members must be above 
reproach.  The integrity of the Commission affects the general perception and trust of the 
citizens in its work. The chairperson and the two members of the Commission are required, 
under the Leadership and Integrity Act, to sign the Leadership and Integrity Code for State 
Officers.22 Breach of the code amounts to misconduct which may result in disciplinary 
proceedings, culminating in removal from office.  The code of conduct only applies to the 
chairperson, members and the secretary of the Commission.23 The Third Schedule to the EACCA 
contains the code of conduct that must be signed by members and employees of the 
Commission.24  Despite the existence of the code of conduct, it is submitted that the biggest 
challenge facing the Commission is to protect its reputation.  
                                                          
20 The number of personnel trained amount to 499. See EACC Annual Report (2011/2012) 42. 
21 A large number of the training sessions attended are those offered by the Council of Legal Education 
courses for lawyers and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya for accountants. See EACC 
Annual Report (2012/2013) 45-50. 
22 Section 40 of the Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012. 
23 Section 3 of the Leadership and Integrity Code. 
24 Section 21 of the EACCA. 
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The initial appointment of Commission office holders was mired in a lot of controversy that 
involved lengthy parliamentary debates and ultimately led to a high court challenge to the 
constitutionality of the appointment of Mumo Matemu as chair of the Commission.25 The high 
court held that Matemu was unsuitable for the position. Subsequently, Matemu escalated the 
matter to the court of appeal, which overturned the decision of the high court.26 
Surprisingly, Mumo Matemu was forced to resign in May 2015 because of allegations of 
corruption, after being suspended by the President on the recommendation of the National 
Assembly. His successor also resigned for similar reasons in August 2016 (after being in office 
for 8 months) when the National Assembly's Justice and Legal Affairs Committee recommended 
his removal from office.27 The integrity of the top managers of the Commission has remained 
questionable and frequently are faced with several corruption allegations, leading to their 
resignation or removal from office. The Commission has been without a chair since 18 October 
2016 following the resignation of its embattled chairperson who was ushered out of office on 
allegations of corruption.28 
This paper submits that there is a need to focus on the integrity of the persons being appointed 
as top office holders of the EACC. This will ensure that the stability which the Commission 
requires to perform its functions. It is impossible to expect the leaders of the EACC to fight 
corruption successfully when they themselves face allegations of corruption. 
The situation is so serious that even the appointment of the chairperson of the EACC is based on 
a shaky jurisprudence of the court of appeal, which essentially upheld the view that serious 
allegations are of no consequence in the vetting of public officials and that only convictions by a 
court count. The court of appeal may have believed that it was raising the standard high enough 
to protect potential appointees against frivolous and vexatious allegations, which is not an 
unmeritorious intention, but what it ended up doing was lowering the bar for candidates 
suitable for public office so patently low that any unconvicted criminal, no matter how notorious 
their crime, is now eligible for the highest office in the Republic of Kenya.29 
                                                          
25 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General and Two Others [2012] eKLR. 
26 Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance and Five Others [2013] eKLR. 
27 Simiyu ‘Kinisu bows to pressure, resigns as EACC chairman’, available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Ethics-Anti-Corruption-Commission/1056-3364272-xedwjez/ (accessed 10 
October 2016). 
28 Daily Nation (August 2016). 
29 Afrimap (2015) 44. 
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Comments and observations such as these will recede only if much attention is paid to the 
Integrity of both the top management and of other appointees to the Commission. 
4.7 Independence 
Independence of an ACA ensures that there is no interference by any arm of government and 
by any person in its activities. It protects the operations of the ACA from any undue influence.  
Article 79 of the Constitution of Kenya requires parliament to enact legislation to establish an 
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. The Commission, in the performance of 
its functions, is not subject to the direction and control of any person or authority.30 However, 
this is an ideal that exists only on paper. In practice, the Commission has been criticised for 
following political direction on how and when to conduct its investigations. For example, the 
Commission summoned the former Prime Minister for questioning on allegations relating to 
graft. Later on the Commission agreed to admit a statement from the former premier’s lawyers. 
When put to task, it failed to explain why it had replaced the summons with a mere 
statement.31 
In addition, the Commission’s independence is subject to interpretation as it is not specifically 
listed amongst the independent institutions established under the Constitution.32 As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the Commission receives instructions from the ODPP about conducting 
investigations. The ODPP also has the power to make nolle prosequi decisions in relation to any 
prosecutions initiated on the instructions of the EACC.33 The ability of the ODPP to interrupt the 
work of the EACC has to be seen as interference. 
  
                                                          
30 Section 28 of the EACCA. 
31 Business Daily (2015). 
32 Article 248 stipulates that the independent commissions are: the Kenya National Human Rights and 
Equality Commission; the National Land Commission; the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission; the Parliamentary Service Commission; the Judicial Service Commission; the Commission on 
Revenue Allocation; the Public Service Commission; the Salaries and Remuneration Commission; the 
Teachers Service Commission; and the National Police Service Commission. The independent offices are 
the Auditor General and the Controller of Budget. 
33 Article 157(6)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
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4.8 Accountability of the EACC 
The EACC is accountable to the President and the National Assembly. It submits reports at the 
end of every financial year, containing its financial statements, descriptions of its activities, 
identification of any impediments to the achievement of its objects and other appropriate 
information relating to its functions.34 
The Commission posts its monthly, quarterly and annual reports on its website to enable the 
public view its work.35  Its interaction with the public through its website and social media 
supports not only dissemination of information but also reporting on corruption. There has 
been an increase in the use of the EACC’s website, which is an indication that Kenyans are keen 
to view the work and reports of the Commission. During the reporting period of 2013/2014, the 
EACC announced that its website had reached 364 159 hits, with an average of 998 hits per day. 
This is high when compared to the initial report of 111 223 hits, with an average of 304 hits per 
day.36 
Other than the reporting requirement, there are no constitutional or legislative provisions that 
obligate the EACC to account to an oversight body. Indeed, there are no checks and balances to 
prevent misconduct by staff of the Commission. The EACC does not have any internal or 
external accountability mechanism. This is a significant omission. Having the Commission 
account to an independent oversight body would allow its work to be scrutinised and assessed 
critically. 
4.9 Funds of the Commission 
Financial resources play an important role in ensuring that the operations of an ACA run 
smoothly. For an ACA to exercise its mandate well, it must be funded well. It must be noted 
that maintaining and managing an ACA is expensive. 
In Kenya, the main source of funds of the EACC is money allocated by parliament. The 
Commission, along with other agencies and ministries, bids for a desired budget from the 
                                                          
34 Section 27 of the EACCA. 
35 See EACC Annual Report (2014/2015). 
36 EACC Annual Report (2013/2014) 57 and EACC Annual Report (2011/2012) 69. 
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government.37 Grants, gifts, loans and donations also constitute funding as long as they are 
disclosed to the National Assembly and made public before being used.38 
The bulk of the EACC’s budgetary allocation goes towards settling salaries and rent.39 This 
leaves but little resources to devote to anti-corruption initiatives. It is recognised widely that 
the Commission should be funded better to enable it to roll out effective anti-corruption 
strategies. 
4.10 Collaboration and Co-operation 
The Commission works closely with non-state actors including civil society organisations, non-
governmental organisations, the media and religious groups to disseminate anti-corruption 
messages and to help inculcate moral and ethical values in the people with whom they interact. 
Thus, for example, the EACC works with the media to disseminate information by press 
releases, briefings and coverage of court proceedings. This partnership ensures that activities of 
the EACC are publicised well.40 Also, collaboration initiatives between the ODPP and the EACC 
involve joint training and investigations aimed at the prosecution of corruption and other 
economic crimes. As a result, guidelines for the investigation and prosecution of these crimes 
have been developed and implemented.41 
Furthermore, the EACC is a member of the Integrated Public Complaints Referral Mechanism 
(IPCRM), which is a joint initiative of different agencies, including the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights, the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee, the 
Commission for Administrative Justice, and Transparency International – Kenya. The main 
objective of the IPCRM is to strengthen the partnership between state oversight bodies in 
                                                          
37 Afrimap (2015) 37. 
38 Section 22(1) & (2) of the EACCA. 
39 Task Force Report (2015) 22. 
40 UNCAC Country Review Report (2015) 71. 
41 Task Force Report (2015) 98. 
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managing and disposing of complaints received from members of the public relating to 
corruption. The mechanism supports online anonymous online corruption reporting.42 
The Financial Reporting Centre, which is Kenya’s financial intelligence unit, contributes to the 
fight against corruption through the sharing of information relating to corruption investigations. 
The EACC and the Financial Reporting Centre have a memorandum of understanding to 
facilitate the receipt and dissemination of information.43 
Regionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, Kenya works closely with other anti-corruption 
bodies, including those in the East African region under the auspices of the East African 
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA). The latter brings together ACAs in the 
Eastern African region and provides a platform for co-operation among them in the fight 
against graft. Globally, the EACC is represented in the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR) 
and actively participates in the various fora organised by that body.44 
The major challenge experienced in effective co-operation and collaboration in the fight against 
corruption is turf wars. The main cause of turf wars is inadequate legal and administrative 
framework, overlapping mandate, lack of structured work plan, high leadership turnover, and 
competition over which agency gets credit over certain results and competition for publicity.45 
The EACC is perhaps “over collaborating”. It has to work with so many institutions that it finds 
itself conflicted by the overlapping mandates of its various partner agencies. The legal 
framework of collaboration should be refined and reinforced to curb such conflicts. 
  
                                                          
42 Task Force Report (2015) 99. 
43 Task Force Report (2015) 99. 
44 EACC Annual Report (2011/2012) 7. 
45 Task Force Report (2015) 102. 
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4.11 Performance of the EACC 
Year 
Complaints 
Prosecutions 
Received Investigated Recommended for Prosecution 
2010/201146 7 106 2 512 113 101 
2011/201247 5 230 2 663 73 43 
2012/201348 3 355 1 423 26 28 
2013/201449 4 006 1 950 43 58 
2014/201550 5 660 2 743 74 99 
Total 25 357 11 291 329 329 
The above table gives details on the investigatory work of the Commission. The data show that 
a huge number of corruption complaints are received and investigated by the EACC. 
Unfortunately, however, only a handful of cases are recommended for prosecution. Although 
their outcomes are unreported, the ODPP has prosecuted the cases recommended to it by 
EACC. Reports indicate that the Commission is affected adversely by slow adjudication and 
court processes. Persons charged with corruption employ the best lawyers who delay cases 
using constitutional references, numerous judicial review applications and frequent 
adjournments.51 
Case backlog also delays the Commission's efforts at asset recovery. Still, the efforts by the 
EACC to recover and trace public assets through prosecutions and out-of-court settlements are 
laudable. The Commission is reported to have recovered assets valued at approximately USD 
6.6 million during 2012/2013, which is an increase over the collection of USD 6.19 million 
                                                          
46 EACC Annual Report (2010/2011) 5,7,20. 
47 EACC Annual Report (2011/2012) 3, 6, 29. 
48 EACC Annual Report (2011/2012) 3. 
49 EACC Annual Report (2013/2014) 3, 22.  
50 EACC Annual Report (2014/2015) 14, 15, 40. 
51 EACC Annual Report (2014/2015) 75.  
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during 2011/2012.52 Similarly, in the preceding year, 2010/2011, the Commission was able to 
recover a total of USD 484 519 of public assets.53 
The Commission has been engaged also in a number of education, training and public 
awareness programmes. It conducts anti-corruption out-reach programmes and disseminates 
anti-corruption action plans throughout the counties of Kenya.54 It has trained 450 community-
based anti-corruption monitors, who track and disrupt corrupt and unethical practices in the 
community.  As to anti-corruption sensitisation, the Commission has been involved in the 
distribution of large amounts of anti-corruption material, including manuals, brochures and 
posters. It also conducts nationwide surveys on corruption, integrity, and ethics.55 
4.12 Conclusion 
Since its inception in 2011, the EACC has spearheaded the anti-corruption agenda in Kenya. Its 
mandate is to investigate corruption and to educate and sensitise the country on anti-
corruption. The Commission is funded well. However, its work has not been without 
shortcomings. While the Commission has received a considerable number of reports and 
subsequently carried out investigations, the recorded number of prosecutions and convictions 
has been negligible. The sensitisation and education programmes have been ineffective 
because Kenya continues to be ranked as highly corrupt according to various corruption 
perceptions indices. In addition, the integrity of the Commission is constantly under attack due 
to corruption allegations levelled against its executive members. 
 
 
                                                          
52 For the reporting period of 2012/2013. See Afrimap (2015) 42. 
53 EACC Annual Report (2013/2014) 23. 
54 EACC Annual Report (2014/2015) 52. 
55 EACC Annual Report (2012/2013) 37. See also EACC Annual Report (2013/2014) 37. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) of Kenya. This 
research begun by discussing the historical background of the EACC, and observations regarding 
its existence and stability were made. It also examined the relationship between the Kenyan 
leadership and the post-independence ACA in an attempt to highlight the role of politics in the 
success or failure of said agency. It reviewed international and national anti-corruption legal 
framework providing for the establishment of ACAs. 
The study found that ACAs are a matter of international concern. This is reflected in 
international conventions such as UNCAC and the AU Convention creating an obligation for 
their states parties to establish an anti-corruption body or bodies. Kenya is a state party to both 
conventions. It also has domesticated these conventions and created its own ACA. 
The study also found that there are various models of anti-corruption bodies. The specialisation 
of such bodies depends on their functions. They can be endowed with investigative, preventive, 
educative, and prosecutorial powers. However, despite the existence of an ample legal 
framework calling for the creation of anti-corruption bodies at international, regional and 
national level, there is no edict on the model to be adopted. Individual states have to select a 
suitable model for their national context. Further, the legal framework pertaining to ACAs is 
silent on their administration and management. 
Factors that can boost the effectiveness of ACAs, as advocated by international bodies, were 
discussed. These factors include the need to have adequate laws, independence and 
accountability, adequate financial resources and staff capacity, co-operation with other key 
institutions, and political will. 
Kenya’s ACA has been in existence for over a decade. The body has undergone rebranding 
several times to become the current Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. The EACC has 
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been in operation for five years. It is the subject of copious legislative provisions. The research 
concluded that the EACC does not suffer for want of legal authority, but that it faces a serious 
problem of impunity and of implementation. Also, the absence of an overarching policy impairs 
the fight against graft, particularly in relation to issues that require a policy position. 
The recruitment and vetting of the executives to the EACC follow an elaborate and rigorous 
process that is advertised. A major challenge here is the appointment of executives whose 
integrity is impeccable. Since the inception of Kenya’s ACA, none of its chairpersons has 
survived the integrity test. All have been removed for lack of integrity.  The commissioners of 
the EACC enjoy security of tenure. However, the secretary of the Commission, who is in charge 
of its day-to-day running operations, does not have security of tenure. The independence of the 
EACC is guaranteed constitutionally. However, it would be misleading to assert that the 
Commission is fully independent as claims of interference from the executive remain common. 
The Commission accounts to the President and the National Assembly by way of annual reports. 
Again, this form of accountability is incomplete as there is no oversight mechanism to keep the 
Commission in check regarding its day-to-day activities.  
Corrupt practices and perpetrators of corruption are found in both the public and the private 
sector. The EACC’s mandate and jurisdiction, however, only extends to public sector corruption. 
This limits its ability to prevent and tackle corruption across all sectors in the country. The EACC 
enlists the support of partners such as the media, NGOs, civil society and other non-state actors 
in the fight against corruption. It is also a member of various international organisations and 
regional anti-corruption initiatives. In discharging its duties, the EACC employs a multi-agency 
approach. The Commission is required to co-ordinate the activities of various agencies in order 
to avoid duplication of functions. However, due to the large number of agencies, such co-
ordination is difficult. The challenges result in turf wars between the Commission and other 
stakeholders. 
Although the EACC has made substantial efforts in the fight against corruption, its overall 
performance in reducing corruption is dismal, as appears from indices, such as those of 
Transparency International, which rank the country’s corruption levels as high. The EACC's 
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initiatives have faced a number of challenges at policy, legislative and institutional level. The 
Commission’s initiatives have been affected also by adverse judicial decisions. The courts have 
set unfavorable judicial precedent with acquittals founded upon technicalities. They have been 
criticised also for being slow in the adjudication of corruption cases and thereby delaying and 
impeding the Commission’s initiatives on asset recovery. 
The Commission examines the operational systems and procedures of various government 
departments, identifies the loopholes for corruption and makes recommendations for 
corrective measures to be taken by the reviewed institution. However, since it lacks 
enforcement mechanisms, the Commission cannot use legal sanctions to ensure compliance 
with its recommendations. Again, this omission impedes the Commission’s overall efforts to 
prevent corruption. 
The Commission's lack of prosecutorial powers has slowed down the pace of corruption 
prosecutions in Kenya, as much time is lost on consultations with the ODPP as to whether or 
not a matter should be investigated. The arrangement of having the EACC investigate 
allegations of corruption and the ODPP prosecute such investigated matters delays the 
prosecution of cases. 
The Commission also suffers from a lack of adequate person power. Its current staff 
complement is below the recommended and approved number. This hampers the operation of 
the Commission and increases its case investigation backlog. The fiscal autonomy of the 
Commission is wanting also. It lacks the ability to roll out effective anti-corruption programmes 
because the resources it receives is only enough to cater for rent and salaries, leaving very little 
for operational expenses. 
5.2 Recommendations 
In order to strengthen the role of EACC in fighting corruption, the following changes are 
recommended. 
 The National Assembly should promote constitutional amendment to include the EACC 
amongst the independent commissions under Article 248 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
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This will avoid any misinterpretations regarding the classification (by inference) of the 
EACC as an independent commission under the Constitution. 
 There is a need to harmonise the legal frameworks regulating corruption and the EACC. 
Harmonisation will ensure that each government agency which performs any anti-
corruption function has a clearly defined mandate. This will reduce the turf wars and 
enhance inter-agency co-operation in the fight against corruption. 
 Currently, the EACA only provides for the general functions of the commission and 
stipulates that the secretary is in charge of the day-to-day management of the EACC. 
The EACA should be amended to provide for the mandate of the executives, 
commissioners and the secretariat. Such inclusion will clarify matters and reduce any 
conflicts of interests that may arise in the discharge of the Commission's functions. 
 In order to boost its performance, the Commission should be given prosecutorial 
powers in terms of Article 157(12) of the Constitution which allows the National 
Assembly to delegate such powers. 
 The secretary of the Commission should be granted security of tenure to protect him or 
her from any threat that may hinder the discharge of the functions of the office without 
fear or favour. 
 There is a need for an independent oversight body to hold the EACC accountable for its 
work and overall performance. 
 The EACC should use technology to enhance its fight against corruption. The use of 
mobile phone applications linked to its website will enhance corruption reporting and 
learning. The website should be updated regularly to ensure that it reflects the current 
situation regarding corruption in the country. 
 The government should provide adequate financial support to the EACC to enable it to 
combat corruption effectively and timeously at both the national and county levels. In 
particular, the Commission currently has only five regional offices, and it should be 
capacitated to open offices and investigatory services in the remaining 42counties of the 
Republic. 
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 The Commission's budgetary allocation should be sufficient to achieve the optimal 
recommended staffing level. 
 Currently, the public makes a caricature of the EACC because of the allegations against 
the integrity of its staff and top executives. As the country’s main ACA, the EACC must 
ensure zero tolerance of corruption amongst its staff. It must put in place the necessary 
preventive measures and conduct regular integrity testing with a view to ensuring that 
its staff is are beyond reproach. Where allegations of impropriety are raised against 
Commission staff, investigations must be expeditious and disciplinary action must be 
taken where necessary. The Commission should adopt a Code of Conduct for its 
investigators. 
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